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Abstract
From Leibniz to Krauss philosophers and scientists have raised the question as to why
there is something rather than nothing (henceforth, the Question). Why-questions request
a type of explanation and this is often thought to include a deductive component. With
classical logic in the background only trivial answers are forthcoming. With free logics in
the background, be they of the negative, positive or neutral variety, only question-begging
answers are to be expected. The same conclusion is reached for the modal version of the
Question, namely ‘Why is there something contingent rather than nothing contingent?’
(except that possibility of answers with neutral free logic in the background is not explored).
The categorial version of the Question, namely ‘Why is there something concrete rather than
nothing concrete?’, is also discussed. The conclusion is reached that deductive explanations
are question-begging, whether one works with classical logic or positive or negative free
logic. I also look skeptically at the prospects of giving causal-counterfactual or probabilistic
answers to the Question, although the discussion of the options is less comprehensive and
the conclusions are more tentative. The meta-question, viz. ‘Should we not stop asking the
Question’, is accordingly tentatively answered affirmatively.
Keywords Existence; Nothingness; Why-questions; Explanations; Free Logic
1 Introduction: The Question and Logic
The central question of this article (henceforth called the Question) is: why there is something
rather than nothing? The following modal question (henceforth called the Modal Question)
will also be considered: why is there something contingent rather than nothing contingent?
These were the questions originally asked by Leibniz (1714). Another question that is of a more
recent origin is the following question (henceforth called the Categorial Question): why is there
something concrete rather than nothing concrete?
Ever since Leibniz raised the Question and the Modal Question, philosophers continue to
reflect on these questions and variations on them and this remains true of contemporary times –
see e.g. (Sommers, 1966; Fleming, 1988; Van Inwagen and Lowe, 1996; Carlson and Olsson, 2001;
Rundle, 2004; Parfit, 2004; Gru¨nbaum, 2004; Maitzen, 2012; Goldschmidt, 2013). That being
said, several philosophical participants to the debate, notably Gru¨nbaum (2004) and Maitzen
(2012), have come to the conclusion that it is an ill-posed question. Gru¨nbaum (2004) calls into
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question the so-called ‘spontaneity of nothingness’, which shifts the burden of explanation to
there being something. He is in favour of asking the counterquestion as to why there should be
nothing (contingent) rather than something (contingent). Maitzen (2012) calls into question the
determinateness of the question, because he thinks that ‘thing’ is a so-called dummy sortal for
which instances there are no clear criteria of identity. This article will also present a skeptical
outlook, albeit from a different perspective than Gru¨nbaum (2004)’s or Maitzen (2012)’s.
A recent development is that some scientists have also started to think about the Question.
What is more, they claim to have answered the Question (Krauss, 2012; Mlodinow and Hawking,
2010). Here is Richard Dawkins, who wrote the afterword of (Krauss, 2012):
Even the last remaining trump card of the theologian, ‘Why is there something rather
than nothing?,’ shrivels up before your eyes as you read these pages. If ‘On the Origin
of Species’ was biology’s deadliest blow to supernaturalism, we may come to see ‘A
Universe From Nothing’ [(Krauss, 2012)] as the equivalent from cosmology. The title
means exactly what it says. And what it says is devastating.
The alleged answer to the Question invokes the scientific hypothesis that seemingly empty space
is pervaded by quantum fields that carry energy. Albert (2012) rightly criticizes this attempt at
answering the Question:
Relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical vacuum states – no less than giraffes or refriger-
ators or solar systems – are particular arrangements of elementary physical stuff. The
true relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical equivalent to there not being any physical
stuff at all isn’t this or that particular arrangement of the fields – what it is (obviously,
and ineluctably, and on the contrary) is the simple absence of the fields! The fact
that some arrangements of fields happen to correspond to the existence of particles
and some don’t is not a whit more mysterious than the fact that some of the possible
arrangements of my fingers happen to correspond to the existence of a fist and some
don’t. And the fact that particles can pop in and out of existence, over time, as those
fields rearrange themselves, is not a whit more mysterious than the fact that fists can
pop in and out of existence, over time, as my fingers rearrange themselves. And none
of these poppings – if you look at them aright – amount to anything even remotely
in the neighborhood of a creation from nothing.
Albert’s point, namely that in attempting to answer the Question Krauss already presupposes
that something exists, will be generalized in the present article. I don’t intend to criticize the
particular naturalistic answer that has been put forward. I intend to criticize any answer that
satisfies certain conditions. And my criticism is in spirit very similar to the point made by Albert.
In this article the main but not exclusive focus is on a logical investigation into the Ques-
tion. For this purpose one needs to have a rough idea about the logic of why-questions, since
the Question is a why-question. Building on Hempel and Oppenheim (1948)’s classical theory
about explanations, Bromberger (1966, p. 604) developed what appears to be the first modern
theory about why-questions. Let us apply his theory of why-questions to the why-question at
hand. The question has a presupposition, viz. that there is something rather than nothing. A
sentence is only then an answer to the question why there is something if the presupposition
is deducible from the sentence together with other true premises. Bromberger (1966)’s specific
account was criticized by Teller (1974) along similar lines as the well-known criticism of Hempel
and Oppenheim (1948)’s theory of explanation. Later, Hintikka and Halonen (1995) and Schurz
(2005) developed their own theories about why-questions in turn. The details of their theories
differ, but each defends the idea that answers to why-questions stand in a deductive relation to
what an explanation is asked for – see e.g. (Hintikka and Halonen, 1995, p. 648) and (Schurz,
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2005, 171-172). So, whatever else needs to be satisfied in order to answer the Question, at the
very least one needs a set of true premises from which one can logically deduce that something
exists. The former is the most prominent approach to why-questions in the literature, but it
is not the only one. Notably Koura (1988) investigates non-deductive explanations as answers
to why-questions. In particular, he studies causal and probabilistic explanations that serve as
answers to why-questions.
As noted by Salmon (1992) it is disputed whether every kind of explanation can function as
an answer to a why-question. Still, it is worth to have a brief look at the theories of explanation,
even if perhaps not every kind of explanation will do as an answer to a why-question. Some
might think that the extant literature on why-questions is too much influenced by an outdated
model of scientific explanation, namely Hempel and Oppenheim (1948)’s deductive-nomological
theory of scientific explanation. But the latter is not the only theory of explanation that has a
deductive element in it. A prominent contemporary theory about explanation is the unification
approach put forward by Kitcher (1981, 1989). Roughly, an event is explained by deducing it
from the most unifying scientific theory. Another example is the kairetic account introduced by
Strevens (2004, 2008), according to which a causal model explains an event only if the event is
entailed by it. To be sure, there are accounts of scientific explanation that are not deductive.
But the important point is that there still are prominent approaches to explanation that do
contain deductive elements. On this point there is no big disconnect between the literature
on why-questions on the one hand and the literature on (scientific) explanations on the other
hand. Nevertheless, it is also important to discuss the prospects of non-deductive answers to the
Question.
Let us assume for now that answers to why-questions involve deductive arguments and,
therefore, depend on logic. This brings me to investigate the relation between the Question
on the one hand and logic on the other hand. In Section 2 I look at the relation between the
Question and the canonical theory about logical deduction, to wit classical first-order logic with
identity. In Section 3 I scrutinize the relation between the Question on the one hand and free
first-order logic with identity on the other hand. Section 4 is devoted to the Modal Question and
the Categorial Question. These questions also studied from both the perspective of classical logic
and free logic. Although the main focus of this article is on deductive answers to the Question,
I will briefly comment on causal and probabilistic answers in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 I
summarize my findings and discuss my conclusions.
2 The Question and Classical Logic
Let us consider first-order logic with identity, CL=. I assume familiarity with the syntax and
semantics of the language of C=, namely L=, and with proof systems for classical first-order logic
with identity – see (Halbach, 2010). One of the uses of identity is to express numerosity (Halbach,
2010, ch. 8) and this is key to understand the way existence is expressed in L=. Suppose that P
stands for being a Wagner opera. One can use:
∃xPx; (1)
∃x∃y (Px∧Py∧x , y) ; (2)
∃x∃y∃z (Px∧Py∧Pz∧x , y∧x , z∧y , z) (3)
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to express respectively that:
there is at least one Wagner opera; (4)
there are at least two Wagner operas; (5)
there are at least three Wagner operas. (6)
If one wants to abstract away from Wagner operas, one needs a universal property. Self-identity,
viz. x = x, will do, since the law of self-identity is a theorem of the logic of identity. With the
help of the predicate that expresses self-identity one can use the following sentences:
∃x(x= x) ; (7)
∃x∃y (x= x∧y = y∧x , y) ; (8)
∃x∃y∃z (x= x∧y = y∧z = z∧x , y∧x , z∧y , z) (9)
to express respectively that:
there is at least one thing; (10)
there are at least two things; (11)
there are at least three things. (12)
Note first that the two last formulas are respectively equivalent to:
∃x∃y (x , y) ; (13)
∃x∃y∃z (x , y∧x , z∧y , z) ; (14)
Second, note that ∃x(x= x) is truth-conditionally equivalent to ∃x∃y (x= y). This is by way of
motivating the following definition, which introduces the existence predicate, E!.
Definition 1 (Existence). E!t=df ∃x(x= t), for any term t.
Importantly, the proof principles of CL= and in particular the principle of existential gen-
eralisation and the law of self-identity allow one to prove that ∃xE!x. In other words, that
there is at least one thing is a theorem of CL=. But then it deductively follows from any set of
premises. Consequently, none of these premises is deductively essential: the conclusion follows
even without them. So, any potential answer violates a non-triviality constraint, viz. that it is
only then an answer when without it one cannot deduce that there is at least one thing – see
e.g. (Hintikka and Halonen, 1995, p. 648). From the point of view of standard logic, the question
why there is something rather than nothing can only be answered in a trivial way.
Non-trivial answers can only be forthcoming if it is not a theorem of logic that there exists
at least one thing. For this purpose one should drop classical logic in favour of free logic, which
is so-called because it is free of existential commitment. The relation between the Question and
free logic is the topic of the next section.
3 The Question and Free Logic
There are three main varieties of free logic. Suppose that nothing exists. How does this affect
the truth-value of atomic subject-predicate sentences? There are three options:
1. they are false;
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2. they can be true;
3. they are neither true nor false.
The first variation is known as negative free logic, the second as positive free logic, the third
as neutral free logic. The three subsections deal with each variation in turn. The emphasis
will be on proof theory, not model theory, since deduction is the central notion in the logic of
why-questions. Details about free logics can be found in (Nolt, 2014) and (Lehmann, 2002).
3.1 The Question and Negative Free Logic
Apart from the axiom schemes of sentential logic, the following are the axiom schemes of negative
free first-order logic with identity (NFL=):
A1 φ→∀xφ, with x not free in φ;
A2 ∀x(φ→ ψ)→ (∀xφ→∀xψ)
A3 ∀xφ, if φ(t/x) is an axiom;
A4 ∀xφ→ (E!t→ φ(t/x));
A5 ∀x(x= x);
A6 t= t′→ (φ→ φ′), with φ′ identical to φ except that zero or more occurrences of t have been
replaced by t′;
A7 P (t1, . . . , tn)→E!ti, with 1≤ i≤ n and with P any n-place predicate, including the identity
predicate;
A8 E!f (t1, . . . , tn)→ E!ti, with 1≤ i≤ n.
The only rule of inference is modus ponens. For convenience we will assume that no free variables
occur in the above terms and formulas, except possibly x in φ or ψ in A2 or in φ in A3 or
A4. Axiom scheme A4 is characteristic for free logic, while axiom schemes A7 and A8 are
characteristic for negative free logic. It is important to notice that one cannot prove the reverse
of axiom scheme A1, although it is a theorem of classical logic. Especially important is that
axiom scheme A1 is equivalent to
A1∗ ∃xφ→ φ (with x not free in φ).
Naturally, the converse is also not provable. Also important is that axiom scheme A4 is equivalent
to:
A4∗ (E!t∧φ(t/x))→∃xφ.
Although the official proof system is the axiomatic one, the following natural deduction rules
will also be used sometimes:
∀I Given a derivation of φ(c/x) from E!c, where c is a new individual constant and does not
occur in φ, discharge E!c and infer ∀xφ.
∃E Given ∃xφ and a derivation of a formula ψ from φ(c/x)∧E!c, where c is a new individual
constant and does not occur in either φ or ψ, discharge φ(c/x)∧E!c and infer ψ from ∃xφ.
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The above rules can be derived in the axiomatic proof system.
The main result of this subsection is that any deduction with an existential conclusion (i.e.,
a sentence of the form ∃xψ for some ψ) starts from at least one premise that is itself existential
or that is logically equivalent to an existential assumption.
Lemma 1. For every sentence φ there is formula ψ with at most one free variable x such that
`NFL= φ↔∃xψ or `NFL= φ↔∀xψ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of φ.
Case 1: suppose that φ is P (t1, . . . , tn), with P an n-place predicate (possibly the identity
predicate) and with t1, . . . , tn terms. Then one can prove that φ is provably equivalent in NFL=
to:
∃x1 . . .∃xn (x1 = t1∧·· ·∧xn = tn∧P (x1, . . . ,xn)) .
For the left-to-right direction use axiom scheme A7 to derive that
P (t1, . . . , tn)∧E!t1∧·· ·∧E!tn.
Use the combination of axiom schemes A5 and A4 to further derive that t1 = t1∧ ·· ·∧ tn = tn.
The conclusion follows by A4∗. For the right-to-left direction use ∃E and axiom scheme A6.
Case 2: suppose that φ is ¬θ. By the induction hypothesis, there is formula ψ with at most
one free variable x such that `NFL= θ↔∃xψ or `NFL= θ↔∀xψ. But then one can prove that
¬θ is equivalent to ¬∃xψ or, equivalently, ∀x¬ψ, or one can prove that ¬θ is equivalent to ¬∀xψ
or, equivalently, ∃x¬ψ.
Case 3: suppose that φ is θ→ ρ. We have to consider four subcases.
Case 3.1: θ is provably equivalent to ∃xα and ρ to ∃xβ. Then φ is provably equivalent
to ∀x(α→∃xβ). Let us prove both directions by reductio ad absurdum. For the left-to-right
direction suppose that ∃xα→ ∃xβ but ¬∀x(α→∃xβ). Then ∃x(α∧¬∃xβ). Proceed by ∃E.
Suppose that E!c∧α(c/x)∧¬∃xβ. The last conjunct together with the first main assumptions
entails that ¬∃xα. Using A4 one can derive that E!c→ ¬α(c/x), which quickly leads to a
contradiction. For the right-to-left direction suppose that ∀x(α→∃xβ) but ¬(∃xα→∃xβ). It
follows that ∃xα∧¬∃xβ. Continuing with ∃E, assume that E!c∧α(c/x). With A4 and the first
of the main assumptions one can deduce that E!c→ (α(c/x)→∃xβ) and, hence, α(c/x)→∃xβ
and, finally, ∃xβ. Contradiction.
Case 3.2: θ is provably equivalent to ∀xα and ρ to ∀xβ. Then φ is provably equivalent
to ∀x(∀xα→ β). Let us prove both directions by reductio ad absurdum. For the left-to-right
direction suppose that ∀xα→∀xβ but ¬∀x(∀xα→ β). Exchanging the quantifier in the second
assumption and proceeding by ∃E assume that E!c∧∀xα∧¬β (c/x). Together with the first
assumption this entails that ∀xβ. By A4 one can deduce that E!c→ β (c/x), which quickly leads
to a contradiction. For the right-to-left direction suppose that ∀x(∀xα→ β) but ¬(∀xα→∀xβ).
Then it follows that ∀xα∧¬∀xβ. Exchanging the quantifier and proceeding by ∃E assume that
E!c∧¬β (c/x). Next, use A4 to derive E!c→ (∀xα→ β (c/x)) from the first main assumption.
This yields β (c/x). Contradiction.
Case 3.3: θ is provably equivalent to ∃xα and ρ to ∀xβ. Then φ is provably equivalent
to ∀x(α→∀xβ). Let us prove both directions by reductio ad absurdum. For the left-to-right
direction suppose that ∃xα→∀xβ but ¬∀x(α→∀xβ). Exchanging the quantifier and proceed-
ing by ∃E assume that E!c∧α(c/x)∧¬∀xβ. The last conjunct together with the first main
assumption entails that ¬∃xα. Exchanging the quantifier and using A4 one can deduce that
E!c→¬α(c/x), which quickly leads to a contradiction. For the right-to-left direction suppose
that ∀x(α→∀xβ) but ¬(∃xα→∀xβ). The latter implies that ∃xα∧¬∀xβ. Proceeding by
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∃E assume that E!c∧α(c/x). By A4 one can deduce from the first main assumption that
E!c→ (α(c/x)→∀xβ). So, ∀xβ and, hence, contradiction.
Case 3.4: θ is provably equivalent to ∀xα and ρ to ∃xβ. Then φ is provably equivalent
to ∃x(∀xα→ β). Let us prove both directions by reductio ad absurdum. For the left-to-right
direction suppose that ∀xα→ ∃xβ but ¬∃x(∀xα→ β). Let us reason by cases from the first
assumption. After exchanging the quantifiers the first case is ∃x¬α. Proceeding by ∃E assume
that E!c∧¬α(c/x). Exchange the quantifiers of the second main assumption and use A4 to
derive that E!c→ (∀xα∧¬β (c/x)). Therefore, ∀xα. Use A4 once more to derive E!c→ α(c/x).
This quickly leads to contradiction. The second case is ∃xβ. Proceeding by ∃E assume that
E!c∧β (c/x). Use A4 to derive that E!c→ (∀xα∧¬β (c/x)). Hence, ¬β (c/x). Contradiction.
For the right-to-left direction suppose that ∃x(∀xα→ β) but ¬(∀xα→∃xβ). We are going to
use ∃E and suppose that E!c∧ (∀xα→ β (c/x)). It follows from the second main assumption
that ∀xα∧¬∃xβ. Hence, β (c/x). By A4 it also follows, after exchanging the quantifier, that
E!c→¬β (c/x). Contradiction follows quickly.
Case 4: φ is ∀xθ. This is trivial.  
Theorem 1. An existential sentence can only be deduced in NFL= from a set of sentences Γ if
at least one of the sentences in Γ is provably equivalent to an existential sentence.
Proof. Consider a set of sentences Γ. Either all sentences in Γ are not provably equivalent to
existential sentences or at least one sentence in Γ is provably equivalent to an existential sentence.
In the first case it follows by Lemma 1 that they are all equivalent to universally quantified sen-
tences. But a model with an empty domain of quantification makes all the universally quantified
sentences true while making any existentially quantified sentence false. So in the first case one
cannot validly deduce an existential sentence from Γ. So, if one can validly deduce an existential
sentence from Γ, then at least one of the sentences of Γ is logically equivalent to an existential
sentence.
 
Whereas CL= has a problematic relation with the Question because it has as a theorem that
there exists something, NFL= does not have the existential claim as a theorem but it does only
yield an existential output if there is an existential input. There is no free lunch in negative free
logic. I take this result to mean that answers to the Question are question-begging, because the
arguments that are the explanations are question-begging. According to Jacquette (1993, p. 319,
322), an argument A is question-begging if and only if
(1) [. . . ] A contains premise P and conclusion C, and P presupposed C.
(2’) P presupposes C if and only if it is not justified to believe P unless it is justified
to believe C.
Similarly, Fischer and Pendergraft (2013, p. 584) claim that
[. . . ] an argument begs the question just in case the proponent of the argument
has no reason to accept the relevant premise, apart from a prior acceptance of the
conclusion.
I claim that these conditions are fulfilled in the case of deductive arguments for the existence of
something. If such arguments have to start from at least one premise that is itself existential
or logically equivalent to an existential assumption, then that premise is only justified if the
existential conclusion is justified.
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3.2 The Question and Positive Free Logic
The axiomatic theory laid out in the previous subsection contains the core of positive free logic
as well: axiom schemes A1-A4, A6 are retained, but A5 is replaced by
A5∗ t= t
and A7-A8 are dropped. Axiom scheme A5∗ is characteristic for positive free logic.
Since A7 has been dropped, one cannot get the proof of a result similar to Lemma 1 off the
ground: the base case depends essentially on A7.
The main result of this subsection is that any deduction with an existential conclusion starts
from at least one premise that is itself existential or it starts from premises the conjunction of
which is logically equivalent to an existential assumption.
Theorem 2. An existential sentence can only be deduced in PFL= from a set of sentences Γ if
at least one of the sentences in Γ is an existential sentence or there are sentences in Γ such that
their conjunction is logically equivalent to an existential sentence.
Proof. The proof is by induction on Γ `PFL= ∃xφ, with φ a formula with at most x free.
Case 1: no existential sentence is a logical axiom of PFL=.
Case 2: if ∃xφ ∈ Γ, then the condition holds, since ∃xφ is an existential sentence.
Case 3: there is a ψ such that Γ `PFL= ψ and Γ `PFL= ψ → ∃xφ. The claim is that
ψ∧(ψ→∃xφ) is logically equivalent to an existential sentence. In what follows keep in mind that
we are dealing with sentences here. First, note that, given ψ→∃xφ, it also follows that ψ→∃xψ.
Since ψ→ ∃xφ is logically equivalent to ¬ψ∨∃xφ, we can argue by cases. Indeed, if ¬ψ, then
ψ→∃xψ, and if ψ, then ∃xφ and so by ∃E and A4∗ ψ→∃xψ as well. Second, given the previous
result and A1∗, it follows that Γ `PFL= ψ ↔ ∃xψ. Third, ∃xψ ∧ (ψ→∃xφ) logically entails
∃x(ψ∧ (ψ→∃xφ)). The proof is by ∃E and axiom scheme A4∗. Therefore, ∃x(ψ∧ (ψ→∃xφ))
is entailed by ψ∧ (ψ→∃xφ). Given A1∗, ∃x(ψ∧ (ψ→∃xφ)) entails ψ∧ (ψ→∃xφ).
Of course, ψ or ψ→ ∃xφ may not belong to Γ. Then there is a finite (and possibly empty)
set of sentences α1, . . . ,αn such that α1, . . . ,αn ∈ Γ and
α1, . . . ,αn `PFL= ψ.
Furthermore, there is a finite (and non-empty) set of sentences β1, . . . ,βm such that β1, . . . ,βm ∈Γ
and
β1, . . . ,βm `PFL= ψ→∃xφ.
Therefore,
α1, . . . ,αn,β1, . . . ,βm `PFL= ψ∧ (ψ→∃xφ) .
As we have seen, the conclusion is logically equivalent to ∃x(ψ∧ (ψ→∃xφ)). It is a consequence
that
α1, . . . ,αn,β1, . . . ,βm `PFL= ∃x(ψ∧ (ψ→∃xφ)) .
Hence,
α1, . . . ,αn,β1, . . . ,βm `PFL= α1→∃x(ψ∧ (ψ→∃xφ)) .
By familiar reasoning, it follows that
α1, . . . ,αn,β1, . . . ,βm `PFL= α1→∃xα1,
which entails that
α1, . . . ,αn,β1, . . . ,βm `PFL= ∃xα1,
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and therefore also
α1, . . . ,αn,β1, . . . ,βm `PFL= ∃xα1∧ . . .αn∧β1∧·· ·∧βm.
The existence quantifier distributes over sentences, so the conclusion is that
α1, . . . ,αn,β1, . . . ,βm `PFL= ∃x(α1∧ . . .αn∧β1∧·· ·∧βm) .
The other direction can be proved by axiom scheme A1∗.  
Corollary 1. An existential sentence can only be deduced in PFL= from a set of sentences Γ
if and only if it can be deduced from a set of sentences Γ∗ that contains at least one existential
sentence or a sentence that is logically equivalent to an existential sentence.
The philosophical import of Corollary 1 is again taken to be that any purported answer to
the Question is question-begging.
3.3 The Question and Neutral Free Logic
The third and final variation is neutral free logic (NEFL=). In fact, there are quite a few options
one can take, depending on how one wants to calculate the truth-value of formulas that have
subformulas that are neither true nor false. For the sake of convenience, I will restrict myself to
the Fregean option: complex formulas that have subformulas that are neither true nor false are
themselves neither true nor false. The proof theory is quite different from NFL= and PFL=. I
will briefly describe the tree proof system developed by Lehmann (2002, 235-237).
A marker ∗ is added to L=. If φ is a well-formed formula of L=, then φ∗ is a well-formed
formula of L∗=. Think of the star marker as an indicator that the formula has a determinate
truth value. An elementary formula is an atomic formula or its negation. The tree proof rules
can be found in Table 1.1
If α is a quantified formula or the negation thereof, or an elementary formula, each term of
which occurs in an elementary ∗-formula above α∗, then the following tree proof rule applies:
α
α∗
A branch closes if and only if
1. it contains a formula and its negation and at least one of those two formulas is a ∗-formula,
or
2. it contains t , t∗ for some term t.
A tree is closed if and only if each of its branches is closed.
One can distinguish between three different deducibility relations:
1. Γ `1 φ iff the tree starting with Γ∗ (i.e., {φ∗ | φ ∈ Γ}) and ¬φ∗ closes;
2. Γ `2a φ iff the tree starting with Γ∗ and ¬φ closes;
3. Γ `2b φ iff the tree starting with Γ and ¬φ∗ closes.
1Lehmann (2002) did not provide rules for vacuously quantified sentences.
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¬¬α
α
¬¬α∗
α∗
α→ β
¬α β
(α→ β)∗
α∗
β∗
¬α∗
β∗
¬α∗
¬β∗
¬(α→ β)
α
¬β
α
¬α
β
¬β
¬(α→ β)∗
α∗
¬β∗
α(s)
s= t∗
α(t)
α(s)∗
s= t∗
α(t)∗
if α is an elementary formula
∀xα(x)∗
α(t)
¬∃xα(x)∗
¬α(t)
if t occurs in an elementary ∗-formula above α(t) or ¬α(t)
¬∀xα(x)∗
y = y∗
¬α(y)∗
∃xα(x)∗
y = y∗
α(y)∗
if y does not occur free above y = y∗
Table 1: Tree proof rules for NEFL=
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The first deducibility relation is supposed to correspond with inferences that do not lead from
true premises to false conclusions. The second deducibility relation is supposed to correspond
with truth-preserving inferences, while the third deducibility relation is supposed to correspond
to inferences that preserve non-falsehood. The notion of deducibility that is most relevant here is
the second one. For theories about deductive explanations hold that an explanans has to be true.
Therefore, an explanans has to have a determinate truth value, which is syntactically indicated
by the star. This rules out the third notion of deducibility. In favour of using the second notion
and not the first notion is that the notion of provable equivalence that can be defined with it has
two useful properties that it otherwise would not have. First, it allows the substitution of a true
sentence in the premise set with another sentence that is provably equivalent to it and, hence,
is true as well. Second, it allows the substitution of a subsentence of a starred sentence, which
itself also has a determinate truth value, with another sentence that is provably equivalent to it
and, hence, has the same determinate truth value. Both properties will be used below.
With the proof theory in place we are ready to prove the following crucial lemma:
Lemma 2. For every sentence φ there is a formula ψ with one free variable x such that φ a2a`2a
∃xψ (x) or φ a2a`2a ∀xψ (x).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of φ. The tree proofs for all the claimed
equivalences can be found in Appendix A.
Case 1-i: φ is P (t1, . . . , tn), with P an n-place predicate (possibly the identity predicate) and
with t1, . . . , tn terms. The sentence in question logically entails
∃x1 . . .∃xn (x1 = t1∧·· ·∧xn = tn∧P (x1∧·· ·∧xn)) .
Case 1-ii: φ is ¬P (t1, . . . , tn), with P an n-place predicate (possibly the identity predicate)
and with t1, . . . , tn terms. The sentence in question logically entails
∃x1 . . .∃xn (x1 = t1∧·· ·∧xn = tn∧¬P (x1∧·· ·∧xn)) .
Case 2: φ is ¬¬ψ. Given the induction hypothesis and the rules for double negation, this is
trivial.
Case 3-i: φ is (α→ β). There are four subcases to consider.
Case 3.1-i: φ is (∃xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x)). The latter is provably equivalent to
∀x(ψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x)) .
Case 3.2-i: φ is (∀xψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x)). The latter is provably equivalent to
∀x(∀xψ1 (x)→ ψ2 (x)) .
Case 3.3-i: φ is (∃xψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x)). The latter is provably equivalent to
∀x(ψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x)) .
Case 3.4-i: φ is (∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ (x)). The latter is provably equivalent to
∃x((∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ (x))∧x= x) .
Case 3-ii: φ is ¬(α→ β). There are four subcases to consider.
Case 3.1-ii: φ is ¬(∃xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x)). The latter is provably equivalent to
∃x¬(ψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x)) .
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Case 3.2-ii: φ is ¬(∀xψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x)). The latter is provably equivalent to
∃x¬(∀xψ1 (x)→ ψ2 (x)) .
Case 3.3-ii: φ is ¬(∃xψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x)). The latter is provably equivalent to
∃x¬(∃xψ1 (x)→ ψ2 (x)) .
Case 3.4-ii: φ is ¬(∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ (x)). The latter is provably equivalent to
∀x((∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ (x))∧x= x) .
Case 4-i: φ is ∃xψ (x) or ∀xψ (x). This is trivial.
Case 4-ii: φ is ¬∃xψ (x) or ¬∀xψ (x). It is provable that ¬∃xψ (x) is equivalent to ∀x¬ψ (x)
and that ¬∀xψ (x) is equivalent to ∃x¬ψ (x).
Again, the tree proofs for all the claimed equivalences can be found in Appendix A.
 
Theorem 3. An existential sentence can only be deduced in NEFL= (in the sense of `1 or
`2a) from a set of sentences Γ if at least one of the sentences in Γ is an existential sentence or
logically equivalent (in the sense of `2a) to one.
Proof. For any sentence φ ∈ Γ there is a formula ψ with one free variable such that φ a2a`2a
∃xψ (x) or φ a2a`2a ∀xψ (x) (Lemma 2). Suppose that they are all provably equivalent to uni-
versally quantified sentences only. Then an existential sentence cannot be deduced. The only
rule that can applied to universally quantified sentences is the instantiation rule. But that rule
can only be applied if there is a term t that occurs in an elementary ∗-sentence higher up. In
the proof of Lemma 2 it was shown that elementary ∗-sentences are provably equivalent to ex-
istentially quantified sentences. By contraposition, a valid deduction of an existential sentence
from a set of starred sentences can only happen if at least one of the starred sentences is logically
equivalent to an existential sentence.  
The philosophical lesson of Theorem 3 is once again that any potential answer to the Question
is question-begging.
4 The Modal Question and the Categorial Question
One might object that the logical investigation of the Question is nice, but the Question is not
the real question. Rather the real question is the Modal question, viz. ‘Why is there something
contingent rather than nothing contingent?’. Or maybe the better question is the Categorial
Question, viz. ‘Why is there something concrete rather than nothing concrete?’. Let us discuss
these more restricted questions in turn.
To carry out a logical investigation into the Modal Question, we need to consider a first-order
language with identity and a necessity operator , viz. L=,. It has the expressive resources to
express that something contingent exists:
∃x(E!x∧¬E!x) . (15)
Note that the above is logically equivalent to ∃x¬E!x, regardless of whether one uses classical
logic or free logic.
With classical first-order logic with identity and the weakest normal modal system, K, in
the background one can prove that everything has necessary existence, expressed by ∀xE!x
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or ∀x∃y (x= y) – see (Menzel, 2014). This makes the presupposition of the Modal Question
logically false. Therefore, no sound argument for the presupposition is forthcoming.
The situation is different with free modal logic. Let us call it NFL=,. or PFL=,, depending
on whether it is an extension of negative free logic or positive free logic. The latter are extended
with modal system S5. For more on axiomatic modal free logic, see (Hughes and Cresswell, 1996,
p. 293-296).2 Necessary existence is no longer a theorem. So the presupposition of the Modal
Question is not logically false. Still, one can prove a result analogous to Theorem 2.
Theorem 4. A sentence of the form ∃x(¬E!x∧φ) can only be deduced in N/PFL=, from a
set of sentences Γ if at least one of the sentences in Γ is a sentence of the form ∃x(¬E!x∧ψ)
or there are sentences in Γ such that their conjunction is provably equivalent to a sentence of the
form ∃x(¬E!x∧ψ).
Proof. The proof is by induction on Γ `N/PFL=, ∃x(¬E!x∧φ), with φ a formula with at most
x free.
Case 1: no sentence of the form ∃x(¬E!x∧φ) is a logical axiom of N/PFL=,.3
Case 2: if ∃x(¬E!x∧φ) ∈ Γ, then the condition holds.
Case 3:4 there is a ψ such that Γ `N/PFL=, ψ and
Γ `N/PFL=, ψ→∃x(¬E!x∧φ) .
First, note that, given ψ→∃x(¬E!x∧φ), it also follows that
ψ→∃x(¬E!x∧ψ) .
Since ψ→∃x(¬E!x∧φ) is logically equivalent to ¬ψ∨∃x(¬E!x∧φ), we can argue by cases.
Indeed, if ¬ψ, then ψ→∃x(¬E!x∧ψ), and if ψ, then by the fact that ψ is a sentence, ∃E and
A4∗ ψ→ ∃x(¬E!x∧ψ) follows as well. Second, given the previous result, the fact that ψ is
a sentence and ∃E, it follows that Γ `N/PPL=, ψ↔ ∃x(¬E!x∧ψ). Third, ∃x(¬E!x∧ψ)∧
(ψ→∃x(¬E!x∧φ)) provably implies
∃x(¬E!x∧ψ∧ (ψ→∃x(¬E!x∧φ))) .
The proof is by ∃E and axiom scheme A4∗. Therefore,
∃x(¬E!x∧ψ∧ (ψ→∃x(¬E!x∧φ)))
is entailed by ψ∧ (ψ→∃x(¬E!x∧φ)). The other direction holds because of ∃E and the fact
that ψ∧ (ψ→∃x(¬E!x∧φ)) is a sentence.
2There is one important difference between N/PFL=, on the one hand and LPCE +S5, the system in
(Hughes and Cresswell, 1996), on the other hand: φ↔∀xφ (provided that x is not free in φ) is an axiom scheme
of LPCE+S5, whereas only the left-to-right direction is an axiom scheme of N/PFL=,. Semantically, the
difference is that in N/PFL=, the world-relative domains of quantification can be empty, whereas they cannot
in LPCE+S5. The formal relevance of S5 consists in the fact that one does not need to assume a certain primitive
rule called UGL∀n. The material relevance of S5 is due to the fact that it is generally taken to the correct logic
for metaphysical or counterfactual necessity – see (Williamson, 2013) for an argument. The dialectical relevance
of S5 is that it gives very strong modal resources to those who attempt a deductive explanation.
3Note that, even if φ↔ ∀xφ (with x not free in φ) were one of the axiom schemes (as in LPCE+S5 – see
footnote 4), this would still hold.
4Hughes and Cresswell (1996, p. 293) mention three other inference rules. For one of these, see note 4. The
two other rules are the rule of necessitation (if `N/PFL=, φ, then `N/PFL=, φ) and the rule of universal
generalisation (if `N/PFL=, φ, then `N/PFL=, ∀xφ). For the two others, note the following two things. First,
they can be made redundant, e.g. one can stipulate that all the axioms are necessary. (Necessity is closed under
modus ponens.) Second, in neither case is the conclusion of the inference of the right syntactic form.
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Of course, ψ or ψ→∃x(¬E!x∧φ) may not belong to Γ. Then there is a finite (and possibly
empty) set of sentences α1, . . . ,αn such that α1, . . . ,αn ∈ Γ and
α1, . . . ,αn `N/PFL=, ψ.
Furthermore, there is a finite (and non-empty) set of sentences β1, . . . ,βm such that β1, . . . ,βm ∈Γ
and
β1, . . . ,βm `N/PFL=, ψ→∃x(¬E!x∧φ) .
Therefore,
α1, . . . ,αn,β1, . . . ,βm `FL=, ψ∧ (ψ→∃x(¬E!x∧φ)) .
As we have seen, the conclusion is provably equivalent to
∃x(¬E!x∧ψ∧ (ψ→∃x(¬E!x∧φ))) .
It is a consequence that
α1, . . . ,αn,β1, . . . ,βm `N/PFL=, ∃x(¬E!x∧ψ∧ (ψ→∃x(¬E!x∧φ))) .
Hence,
α1, . . . ,αn,β1, . . . ,βm `N/PFL=, α1→∃x(¬E!x∧ψ∧ (ψ→∃x(¬E!x∧φ))) .
By familiar reasoning, it follows that
α1, . . . ,αn,β1, . . . ,βm `N/PFL=, α1→∃x(¬E!x∧α1) ,
which entails that
α1, . . . ,αn,β1, . . . ,βm `N/PFL=, ∃x(¬E!x∧α1) .
Since α1, . . . ,αn,β1, . . . ,βm are sentences and since one has ∃E, the conclusion is that
α1, . . . ,αn,β1, . . . ,βm `FL=, ∃x(¬E!x∧α1∧ . . .αn∧β1∧·· ·∧βm) .
The other direction follows directly from ∃E and the assumption that
α1, . . . ,αn,β1, . . . ,βm
are sentences.5  
With free logic of either the positive or negative flavour in the background, it is not only the
Question that can only receive question-begging answers, but also the Modal Question can only
receive question-begging answers. For neutral free logic one would need to have rules for φ(∗)
and ¬φ(∗), but I am not going to pursue that option here.
To carry out a logical investigation into the Categorial Question, we need to consider a
first-order language with identity, the necessity operator  and a concreteness predicate C, viz.
L=,,C . It has the expressive resources to express that something concrete exists:
∃x(E!x∧C (x)) . (16)
Note that the above is logically equivalent to ∃xC (x), regardless of whether one uses classical
logic or free logic.
5Note that the proved equivalences in Case 3 are unaffected even if one were to add φ↔∀xφ (with x not free
in φ) as an axiom scheme.
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Some philosophers embrace the necessity of existence (∀xE!x), which is provable in classical-
first order logic with identity and modal system K (Linsky and Zalta, 1994; Williamson, 2013).
They think that the necessity of existence is defensible, as long as one is careful not to interpret
the quantifiers as ranging over concrete objects only and, if the domain of quantification does
contain concrete objects, then one should allow objects to be contingently concrete. Coming from
this angle one may want to reformulate the Categorial Question as follows: why does anything
contingently concrete exist rather than nothing? In other words, one requests an explanation for
∃x(E!x∧C (x)∧¬C (x)) , (17)
which again can be simplified to ∃x(C (x)∧¬C (x)). It is for this reason that I consider a
language that contains the necessity operator as well.
Now let me make two observations. First, one can a prove a theorem that is completely
analogous to Theorem 4.
Theorem 5. A sentence of the form ∃x(C (x)∧φ) can only be deduced in N/PFL=,,C from a
set of sentences Γ if at least one of the sentences in Γ is a sentence of the form ∃x(C (x)∧ψ) or
there are sentences in Γ such that their conjunction is provably equivalent to a sentence of the
form ∃x(C (x)∧ψ).
Proof. Run through the proof of Theorem 4 and systematically replace ¬E!x with C (x).  
Second, unlike with the Question and the Modal Question one does not get trivialisation if
classical logic in the background, but one can expect the deductive explanations to be question-
begging. Note that one can obtain classical logic from free logic by adding ∃xE!x and E!t to the
axioms. Neither of these has the form ∃x(C (x)∧φ). Since classical logic is an extension of free
logic and since ∃x(C (x)∧φ) still does not belong to the axiomatic base, Theorem 5 applies as
well.
5 The Question and Causal and Probabilistic Answers
So far we have been assuming that answers to why-questions are deductive arguments and,
hence, depend on logic. Let us now drop that assumption and have a brief look at non-deductive
answers. Koura (1988) studies two main alternatives, namely causal answers and probabilistic
answers. Let us discuss them in turn.
The first main alternative consists in causal answers. As was already mentioned in Section 1,
there are variations of the causal approach that are deductive as well, notably the kairetic account
of Strevens (2004, 2008). But here the focus has to be on non-deductive causal theories. Also,
some of the theories about causation are probabilistic in nature, notably the causal-relevance
model of Salmon (1971). This also has to be put aside. What is left is the counterfactual approach
to causation, which goes back to Lewis (1973a, 1986), but which nowadays comes in different
shapes (Woodward and Hitchcock, 2003). Surveying all the possibilities would considerably
lengthen this article, so I propose to have a look at the simplest counterfactual theory of causation
(Lewis, 1973a): an event C causally depends on an event E if and only if, had C not occurred, E
would not have occurred, and if C had occurred, E would have occurred. Let  be the symbol
for the counterfactual conditional. The condition on causation can then be expressed as follows:
(¬C ¬E)∧ (C E). It is this theory that was used by Koura (1988, p. 196) in his theory
about why-questions.
Before we continue, it is important to stop for a moment and reflect on the interpretation of
the symbols. It is all good and well to have a theory that is about the causal relation between
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events, but events are located in space and time and this restricts the applicability of the theory to
the Question. Let us assume then that the counterfactual account has been properly generalized.
I don’t need to provide any details here: that is up for those who want to answer the Question.
The (simple) counterfactual approach to causation and, indirectly, explanation does not allow
for non-question-begging answers to the Question. Suppose that there is a sentence φ such
that φ ∃xE!x. Note that an important inference rule for counterfactual conditionals is the
following (Lewis, 1973b, p. 27): if φ ψ, then φ→ ψ. So, we also have that φ→ ∃xE!x. As
Koura (1988, p. 196) points out, a causal-counterfactual answer to a why-question requires that
the antecedent of the counterfactual conditional is true. So, we also have φ. Then we can
reason as before and deduce that φ→ ∃xφ and, hence, ∃xφ. One can then logically deduce
that ∃x(φ∧φ ∃xE!x). Since the latter logically entails φ∧φ ∃xE!x (axiom scheme A1∗),
the answer is again question-begging. This analysis presupposes negative or positive free logic.
For an analysis that starts from neutral free logic one would need rules for (α β)(∗) and
¬(α β)(∗).
The second main alternative consists in probabilistic answers. The minimal version of this
is that C explains E if and only if the probability of E conditional on C is higher than the
unconditional probability of E. Let Pr be the symbol for probability functions. The condition
can then be expressed as follows: Pr (E | C) > Pr (E). It is this version that was used by
Koura (1988, p. 197). Of course, the conditional probability of E on C might be low as long
as the unconditional probability of E is lower still. Some philosophers think that this is too
minimal. E.g., Salmon (1992, p. 33) remarks that statistical relevance, to which probability-
raising belongs, can be used as evidence for causal relevance, but it is causal relevance that
carries explanatory weight. Woodward (2014, Section 3.4) elaborates on this. Strevens (2000)
claims that probabilistic explanations with higher probabilities are better, while he also suggests
that in the case of low probabilities it is something else that is explanatorily significant. With
these qualifications in mind, let us look at probabilistic answers to the Question.
An immediate problem is to find a suitable interpretation of the probabilities. The subjective
interpretation of probability as degree of belief by a doxastic agent is not well-suited. For
broadly speaking Cartesian considerations make it implausible that a doxastic agent does not
assign probability one to the proposition that he exists.6 This would make probabilistic answers
to the Question impossible. For if Pr (∃xE!x) = 1, then there cannot be an answer φ such
that Pr (∃xE!x | φ)>Pr (∃xE!x). Of course, there are alternative interpretations of probability,
viz. quasi-logical and objective interpretations (Ha´jek, 2012). Let us assume for the sake of
the argument that an interpretation of probability can be given that also makes sense of the
Question. A further issue is then how to assign probabilities to the various possibilities, including
the possibility that nothing exists. Kotzen (2013) discusses various difficulties with this. I will
not go into these difficulties, but I want to point out that there is a common but debatable
assumption that goes back at least to the contribution by Van Inwagen and Lowe (1996) to the
debate. The assumption is that there is only one possible world with an empty universe. That
assumption is all right if one presupposes negative free logic. But in positive free logic there are,
for instance, at least two models with an empty domain of quantification, where the first model
makes an atomic sentence true and the second model makes it false. The reason is that besides a
possibly empty inner domain of quantification models for that logic have also a non-empty outer
domain. The interpretation function can assign subsets of that outer domain to predicates.
Suppose that one can make sense of the probability in a probabilistic answer to the Question
and that one has a grasp on how to assign the probabilities. Let φ be a sentence such that
Pr (∃xE!x | φ) > Pr (∃xE!x). Normally it is postulated that, if `CL= φ, then Pr (φ) = 1. This
postulate has to be replaced by the corresponding one for free logic. Note also that, if φ ` ψ,
6I say ‘broadly speaking’, because Hintikka (1962) points to some problems that I will not elaborate on.
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then Pr (φ) ≤ Pr (ψ). Moreover, if φ a` ψ, then Pr (φ) = Pr (ψ). Finally, we need some facts
about conditional probability. First, if φ ` ¬ψ, then Pr (ψ | φ) = 0. Second, if φ a` ψ, then
Pr (φ | θ) = Pr (ψ | θ). Third, Pr (φ | ψ) = Pr (φ∧ψ | ψ). Applying the law of total probability
to ∃xφ yields the following:
Pr (∃xφ) = (Pr (φ)×Pr (∃xφ | φ)) + (Pr (¬φ)×Pr (∃xφ | ¬φ)) .
One can prove in free logic that ∃xφ is logically equivalent with ∃xE!x∧φ. But then
Pr (∃xφ | ¬φ) = 0.
So, Pr (∃xφ) = Pr (φ)×Pr (∃xφ | φ). Furthermore, note that the logical equivalence of ∃xφ and
∃xE!x∧φ entails that Pr (∃xE!x | φ) = Pr (∃xφ | φ). Next, assume that Hempel and Oppenheim
(1948) are right about the fact that probabilistic explanations need to make the explanandum
highly probable, or that Strevens (2004) is right that higher probabilities result in better expla-
nations. We already knew that Pr (∃xφ)≤ Pr (φ). If Pr (∃xE!x | φ) is higher and, therefore, on
our assumption gives a better probabilistic explanation, then the difference between Pr (∃xφ)
and Pr (φ) is smaller. This argument may induce one to think that probabilistic answers to the
Question may be in a sense question-begging as well, although I admit that the result is not as
rock-solid as previously obtained results.
In this section the possibility of causal and probabilistic answers to the Question has been
investigated. For the simplest type of causal-counterfactual answers and against a background
of negative or positive free logic I have argued that any answers have to be question-begging.
I have not surveyed all the types of causal-counterfactual answers nor have I looked at it from
the perspective of neutral free logic. For probabilistic answers I have mentioned a couple of
issues. They may ultimately have to be replaced by causal answers. It is not clear how to
interpret the probabilities in this context. And one has to to be careful in one’s assignment
of probabilities. Setting all that aside, I have argued that the higher the probability of there
existing something conditional on the answer, the closer to equiprobability the answer and its
existential counterpart are. The discussion in this section is much less comprehensive and the
conclusions are more tentative than the discussion and conclusions in Sections 2 and 3.
6 Conclusion: Stop Asking The Question?
Leibniz’s question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ continues to attract attention.
In this article I have undertaken a logical study of the Question. The starting point was the
logic of why-questions. An answer to a why-question is an explanation. According to some
prominent theories of explanation an explanation has a deductive component: at some point the
presupposition of the question has to be deduced from something else.
The background logic cannot be classical first-order logic with identity, since it has as a
theorem that at least one thing exists. Therefore any purported answer to the Question is
trivial. In free logics it is not a theorem that at least one thing exists. Free logics come in three
main varieties, viz. negative, positive and neutral. I have proved that, if negative free logic is
the background logic, any argument with an existential sentence as conclusion has at least one
premise that is provably equivalent to an existential sentence (Theorem 1). Next I have proved
that, if positive free logic is in the background, any argument with an existential sentence as
conclusion has at least one premise that is itself an existential sentence or there are premises
such that their conjunction is provably equivalent to an existential sentences (Theorem 2). Then
I have proved that, if neutral free logic (in its Fregean form) is in the background, any argument
with an existential sentence as conclusion and truth-determinate sentences as premises has at
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least one premise that is provably equivalent to an existential sentence (Theorem 3). All three
main results are taken to imply that any answer to the Question is question-begging.
In addition I have looked at the Modal Question, viz. ‘Why is there something contingent
rather than nothing contingent?’. If the deductive framework is classical, the presupposition
of the question is logically false, which precludes sound arguments for it. If the deductive
framework is free logic in its positive or negative variety, then any purported answer is question-
begging (Theorem 4). The possibility of answering the modal version of the Question against
the backdrop of neutral free logic has not been investigated. Furthermore I have discussed the
Categorial Question, viz. ‘Why is there something concrete rather than nothing concrete?’. Here
we have found that deductive explanations are question-begging, whether one assumes positive
or negative free logic or classical logic (Theorem 5).
In Section 5 the assumption that answers to why-questions have a deductive component
was dropped. Two major alternatives were considered, namely ‘causal’ or rather counterfactual
answers and probabilistic answers. In both cases there are interpretational difficulties, but setting
those aside I provided two reasons to be skeptical. On a simple counterfactual analysis answers
to the Question have to be question-begging. Probabilistic answers are better to the extent
that the probability of the existentially quantified version of the answer is closer to the answer
itself, which has a whiff of circularity around it. The discussion and conclusions of the Section 5
were much less comprehensive and much more tentative than before but the outlook remained
negative.
On the assumption that answers to why-questions need to have a deductive component, the
conclusion is that neither the Question nor the Modal Question nor the Categorial Question
can be answered adequately. (But recall that the possibility of answers to the modal and the
categorial versions of the Question against the background of neutral free logic have not been
studied.) The meta-question is then naturally: should we not stop asking the Question and its
ilk? According to Searle (1969) the point of asking questions is to request something. In the case
of why-questions (a type of) explanations is requested for. If one knows that a request cannot be
met, it is pointless to keep requesting it. So, the rational answer to the meta-question is positive.
If the underlying assumption is dropped and the possibility of ‘causal’ or probabilistic answers
to the Question are considered, then it may still be rational to ask the Question, although there
are reasons to be skeptical in this case as well.
A Tree proofs for Lemma 2
Before giving the tree proofs, let me remind the reader that (α∧β) is definitionally equivalent
to ¬(α→¬β) and, consequently, ¬(α∧β) is definitionally equivalent to ¬¬(α→¬β), which
logically entails (α→¬β) (cf. the tree rules for double negation). So, one can use the rules for
material implications.
α∧β
α
β
α
¬α
β
¬β
(α∧β)∗
α∗
β∗
¬(α∧β)
¬α ¬β
¬(α∧β)∗
α∗
¬β∗
¬α∗
¬β∗
¬α∗
β∗
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For convenience, whenever the reductio assumption of a tree proof is a quantified sentence or
the negation thereof the marker ∗ will be added directly.
Case 1-i. For convenience and without loss of generality, let us consider only P (t)∗ and ∃x(x= t∧P (x))∗.
P (t)∗
¬∃x(x= t∧P (x))∗
¬(t= t∧P (t))
t , t
t , t∗
×
¬P (t)
×
∃x(x= t∧P (x))∗
¬P (t)
y = y∗
(y = t∧P (y))∗
y = t∗
P (y)∗
¬P (y)
×

Case 1-ii. For convenience and without loss of generality, let us consider only P (t)∗ and ∃x(x= t∧P (x))∗.
¬P (t)∗
¬∃x(x= t∧¬P (x))∗
¬(t= t∧¬P (t))
t , t
t , t∗
×
¬¬P (t)
×
∃x(x= t∧¬P (x))∗
¬¬P (t)
y = y∗
(y = t∧¬P (y))∗
y = t∗
¬P (y)∗
¬P (t)∗
×

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Case 3.1.
(∃xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∗
¬∀x(ψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∗
y = y∗
¬(ψ1 (y)→∃xψ2 (x))∗
ψ1 (y)∗
¬∃xψ2 (y)∗
∃xψ1 (x)∗
∃xψ2 (x)∗
×
¬∃xψ1 (x)∗
∃xψ2 (x)∗
×
¬∃xψ1 (x)∗
¬∃xψ2 (x)∗
¬ψ1 (y)
×
∀x(ψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∗
¬(∃xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))
∃xψ1 (x)
¬∃xψ2 (x)
∃xψ1 (x)∗
¬∃xψ2 (x)∗
y = y∗
ψ1 (y)∗
(ψ1 (y)→∃xψ2 (x))
¬ψ1 (y)
×
∃xψ2 (x)
×
∃xψ1 (x)
¬∃xψ1 (x)
∃xψ1 (x)∗
×
∃xψ2 (x)
¬∃xψ2 (x)
∃xψ2 (x)∗
×

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Case 3.2.
(∀xψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x))∗
¬∀x(∀xψ1 (x)→ ψ2 (x))∗
y = y∗
¬(∀xψ1 (x)→ ψ2 (y))∗
∀xψ1 (x)∗
¬ψ2 (y)∗
∀xψ1 (x)∗
∀xψ2 (x)∗
ψ2 (y)
×
¬∀xψ1 (x)∗
∀xψ2 (x)∗
×
¬∀xψ1 (x)∗
¬∀xψ2 (x)∗
×
∀x(∀xψ1 (x)→ ψ2 (x))∗
¬(∀xψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x))
∀xψ1 (x)
¬∀xψ2 (x)
∀xψ1 (x)∗
¬∀xψ2 (x)∗
y = y∗
¬ψ2 (y)∗
(∀xψ1 (x)→ ψ2 (y))
¬∀xψ1 (x)
×
ψ2 (y)
×
∀xψ1 (x)
¬∀xψ1 (x)
∀xψ1 (x)∗
×
∀xψ2 (x)
¬∀xψ2 (x)
∀xψ2 (x)∗
×

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Case 3.3.
(∃xψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x))∗
¬∀x(ψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x))∗
y = y∗
¬(ψ1 (y)→∀xψ2 (x))∗
ψ1 (y)∗
¬∀xψ2 (x)∗
∃xψ1 (x)∗
∀xψ2 (x)∗
×
¬∃xψ1 (x)∗
∀xψ2 (x)∗
×
¬∃xψ1 (x)∗
¬∀xψ2 (x)∗
¬ψ1 (y)
×
∀x(ψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x))∗
¬(∃xψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x))
∃xψ1 (x)
¬∀xψ2 (x)
∃xψ1 (x)∗
¬∀xψ2 (x)∗
y = y∗
ψ1 (y)∗
(ψ1 (y)→∀xψ2 (x))
¬ψ1 (y)
×
∀xψ2 (x)
×
∃xψ1 (x)
¬∃xψ1 (x)
∃xψ1 (x)∗
×
∀xψ2 (x)
¬∀xψ2 (x)
∀xψ2 (x)∗
×

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Case 3.4.
(∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∗
¬∃x((∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∧x= x)∗
∀xψ1 (x)∗
∃xψ2 (x)∗
y = y∗
ψ2 (y)∗
¬((∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∧y = y)
¬(∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))
×
y , y
×
¬∀xψ1 (x)∗
∃xψ2 (x)∗
y = y∗
ψ2 (y)∗
¬((∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∧y = y)
¬(∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))
×
y , y
×
¬∀xψ1 (x)∗
¬∃xψ2 (x)∗
y = y∗
¬ψ1 (y)∗
¬((∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∧y = y)
¬(∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))
×
y , y
×
∃x((∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∧x= x)∗
¬(∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))
y = y∗
((∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∧y = y)∗
(∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∗
y = y∗
×

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Case 3.1-ii.
¬(∃xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∗
¬∃x¬(ψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∗
∃xψ1 (x)∗
¬∃xψ2 (x)∗
y = y∗
ψ1 (y)∗
¬¬(ψ1 (y)→∃xψ2 (x))
ψ1 (y)→∃xψ2 (x)
¬ψ1 (y)
×
∃xψ2 (y)
×
∃x¬(ψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∗
¬¬(∃xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))
y = y∗
¬(ψ1 (y)→∃xψ2 (x))∗
ψ1 (y)∗
¬∃xψ2 (x)∗
∃xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x)
¬∃xψ1 (x)
¬∃xψ1 (x)∗
¬ψ1 (y)
×
∃xψ2 (x)
×

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Case 3.2-ii.
¬(∀xψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x))∗
¬∃x¬(∀xψ1 (x)→ ψ2 (x))∗
∀xψ1 (x)∗
¬∀xψ2 (x)∗
y = y∗
¬ψ2 (y)∗
¬¬(∀xψ1 (x)→ ψ2 (y))
∀xψ1 (x)→ ψ2 (y)
¬∀xψ1 (x)
×
ψ2 (y)
×
∃x¬(∀xψ1 (x)→ ψ2 (x))∗
¬¬(∀xψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x))
y = y∗
¬(∀xψ1 (x)→ ψ2 (x))∗
∀xψ1 (x)∗
¬ψ2 (y)∗
∀xψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x)
¬∀xψ1 (x)
×
∀xψ2 (x)
ψ2 (y)
×

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Case 3.3-ii.
¬(∃xψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x))∗
¬∃x¬(∃ψ1 (x)→ ψ2 (x))∗
∃xψ1 (x)∗
¬∀xψ2 (x)∗
y = y∗
¬ψ2 (y)∗
¬¬(∃ψ1 (x)→ ψ2 (y))
¬∃xψ1 (x)
×
ψ2 (y)
×
∃x¬(∃xψ1 (x)→ ψ2 (x))∗
¬¬(∃xψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x))
y = y∗
¬(∃xψ1 (x)→ ψ2 (y))∗
∃xψ1 (x)∗
¬ψ2 (y)∗
∃xψ1 (x)→∀xψ2 (x)
¬∃xψ1 (x)
×
∀xψ2 (x)
ψ2 (y)
×

Case 3.4-ii.
¬(∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∗
¬∀x¬((∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∧x= x)∗
y = y∗
¬¬((∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∧y = y)∗
(∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∗
y = y∗
∀xψ1 (x)∗
¬∃xψ2 (x)∗
∀xψ1 (x)∗
∃xψ2 (x)∗
×
¬∀xψ1 (x)∗
∃xψ2 (x)∗
×
¬∀xψ1 (x)∗
¬∃xψ2 (x)∗
×

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Case 3.4-ii Cont.
∀x¬((∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∧x= x)∗
¬¬(∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))
∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x)
¬∀xψ1 (x)
y = y∗
¬ψ1 (y)∗
¬((∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∧y = y)
¬(∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))
∀xψ1 (x)
¬∃xψ2 (x)
×
∀xψ1 (x)
¬∀xψ1 (x)
×
∃xψ2 (x)
¬∃xψ2 (x)
∃xψ2 (x)∗
×
¬y = y
×
∃xψ2 (x)
y = y∗
ψ2 (y)∗
¬((∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))∧y = y)
¬(∀xψ1 (x)→∃xψ2 (x))
∀xψ1 (x)
¬∃xψ2 (x)
×
∀xψ1 (x)
¬∀xψ1 (x)
×
∃xψ2 (x)
¬∃xψ2 (x)
∃xψ2 (x)∗
×
¬y = y
×

Case 4-ii.
¬∃xφ(x)∗
¬∀x¬φ(x)∗
y = y∗
¬¬φ(y)∗
¬φ(y)
×
∀x¬φ(x)∗
¬¬∃xφ(x)∗
∃xφ(x)∗
y = y∗
φ(y)∗
¬φ(y)
×
¬∀xφ(x)∗
¬∃x¬φ(x)∗
y = y∗
¬φ(y)∗
¬¬φ(y)
×
∃x¬φ(x)∗
¬¬∀xφ(x)∗
y = y∗
¬φ(y)∗
∀xφ(x)∗
φ(y)
×

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